Incidencia de la composición de juntas directivas y su grado de formación en el desempeño financiero de las empresas colombianas
Impact of the composition of boards of directors and their degree of training on the financial performance of colombian companies
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El mercado de valores colombiano ha sido poco estudiado desde la perspectiva del Gobierno Corporativo y menos aún, si se considera la composición de las Juntas Directivas de las empresas que cotizan en la Bolsa de Valores. Este artículo busca evidenciar si el nivel de formación y la composición entre externos e internos de las Juntas Directivas inciden en el desempeño financiero de estas entidades. Para tal fin, se emplea una muestra de empresas que cotizan en bolsa y que cuentan con los datos necesarios para el estudio. La información se analizó a través de un modelo de panel de datos y se encuentra que el nivel de formación no tiene relación con el desempeño financiero de las empresas, y que el grado de personas externas (independientes) que están en la organización influyen positivamente en el EBITDA.
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