

## Concept of Time in Kant, a vision of Heidegger<sup>1</sup>

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**Resumen:** Dentro de la filosofía moderna sabemos lo que representa la visión del tiempo como intuición pura dentro del sistema kantiano, y no podemos pasar por alto que la intuición es esa lectura desde dentro que nos sitúa en una posición metafísica. La intuición en Kant es *Anschauung* que se divide en sentido interno (tiempo) y sentido externo (espacio). La *Anschauung* (= intuición) es una especie de *Vorstellung* (= imaginar) y, por tanto, un acto de hacer de las “cosas” objetos y objetivos (*Vergegenständlichung, ens qua obiectum*). Aclaramos que esta interpretación del filósofo de la selva negra nos da un contexto muy interesante ya que no es nuevo que haya comentado a otros pensadores y es una de las interpretaciones en las que respetó la posición del filósofo Königsberg en su obra magna *Ser y tiempo (Sein und Zeit)*, Pero esta era la anterior, ya que la obra de la que tomo este breve trabajo es *Kant y el problema de la metafísica, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, concretamente en el § 9 y § 10 de esta obra, se centrará nuestra reflexión.

**Palabras clave:** Tiempo, intuición, existencia, metafísica.

**Abstract:** Within modern philosophy we know what the view of time represents as pure intuition within the Kantian system, and we cannot overlook the fact that intuition is that reading from within which places us in a metaphysical position. Intuition in Kant is *Anschauung* which splits into inner sense (time) and outer sense (space). *Anschauung* (= intuition) is a sort of *Vorstellung* (= imagining) and thus an act of making “things” objects and objective (*Vergegenständlichung, ens qua obiectum*). We make it clear that this interpretation of the philosopher from the black forest gives us a very interesting context since it is not new that he has commented on other thinkers and it is one of the interpretations in which he respected the position of the philosopher Königsberg in his magnum opus *Being and Time (Sein und Zeit)*, But this was his previous one, since the work from which I take up this short paper is *Kant and the problem of metaphysics/Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, specifically in § 9 and § 10 of this work, our reflection will be focused.

**Keywords:** Time, intuition, existence, metaphysics.

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The concept of the time may sound like notions that are used within physics, today let's see what Kant and Heidegger's proposal and vision tell us.

We can quote Kant's own conclusions on the subject of time:

Time is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from any experience. For simultaneity or succession would not even enter our perception if the presentation of time did not underlie them a priori. Only on the presupposition of this presentation can we present this and that as being at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (sequentially).

Time is a necessary presentation that underlies all intuitions. As regards appearances in general, we cannot annul time itself, though we can quite readily remove appearances from time. Hence time is given a priori. All actuality of appearances is possible only in time. Appearances, one and all, may go away; but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be annulled<sup>2</sup>.

This metaphysical view of time can open up the idea of time not only on the suprasensible side, in the factual mode of the manifestation of time in Kant, we can at some point think of this notion of time as the movement according to a before and an after, the notion of time that is given as a priori knowledge can serve us to situate ourselves in the spatiality and existence of phenomena which occur as object of our experience.

In the brief commentary that we intend to make, it is necessary to turn to one of the interpretations of Heidegger's work, which we quote for its understanding:

Kant posits space and time as pure intuitions. It is worthwhile, first of all with reference to space, to show how it manifests itself in the finite knowledge of beings and, accordingly, to show that alone in which its essence is presentable.

Kant lays out the unveiling of the essence of space and time in such a way that he [first gives] a negative characterization of the phenomenon, from which he then lets the appropriate positive characterization follow.<sup>3</sup>

We must understand and reaffirm Heidegger's interpretation of the conception of time as being accompanied by space, which allows us to determine existence not only in a corporeal sense, but also in a metaphysical sense. That means: through time as the form of pure intuition my consciousness is putting or (better) posing (lat.: *ponere*, Ger.: [*Vor*].*Stellen*) an existing "thing" as an object of my experience. Time as a pure form of intuition brings forth the objectivity of an object, thus poses the ens qua ens in the sense of "object" of my experience, which is why

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<sup>2</sup> Kant (*KRV*, §4 A 31)

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger (*GA 3* § 9)

pure intuition is said to have a profound ontological concept, because the pure forms of intuition are the conditions of possibility of ens qua ens in the sense of “an object” of my experience. The pure forms of intuition are determining and setting the Being of the beings in the sense of “an object”, in the sense of “objectivity”.

Kant also speaks to us with Heidegger's perspective and interpretation of the notion of time with an application to the spatio-temporal.

We quote in the above-mentioned work part of § 10:

Therefore, time is “the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuiting of ourselves and our inner state. Time determines ‘the relation of representations in our inner state.’ ... time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it has to do with neither shape nor position, etc.”

In this way both pure intuitions, space and time, are allotted to two [different] regions of experience, and at first it appears to be impossible to find a pure intuition which constitutes every instance of knowledge of the Being of experienceable beings and which, therefore, permits the problem of ontological knowledge to be formulated universally<sup>4</sup>.

I would like to conclude that the notions proposed in this brief text allow us to refer to the profound meaning proposed by Heidegger, as I recalled in a work by Dr. Ángel Xolocotzi, which I would like to quote not verbatim but in paraphrase: despite the fact that the term chosen by Heidegger, Dasein, is synonymous with “existence” in common language, that is to say, it serves to indicate what there is, in *Being and Time* our author emphasizes the character of openness with which the Da (there) that integrates it can be understood. Dasein is not merely a spatial *being there*, as a literal translation would indicate, but an open, and “Open” “means” “open into the world”. Dasein as being there is eo ipse “being in(to) the world”.

In the words of Dr. Ales Novak, one of the conclusions we can draw is the following: key is, that Heidegger's interpretation stresses the “fact” that time as a form of pure intuition of our mind/consciousness is setting the being (*Sein*) in the sense of “an object of my experience”. This allows then e.g. to understand, to know, to explore, to do science etc. First, out of the constant flux of the diversity, which is stimulating our senses we have to make an object of our experience, and then we can be scientists and/or philosophers.

## Referencias

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<sup>4</sup> Heidegger (GA 3 § 10)

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